Secret negotiations Cuban Missile Crisis

letter chairman khrushchev president kennedy, october 26, 1962

on october 26 @ 6:00 pm edt, state department started receiving message appeared written khrushchev. saturday @ 2:00 am in moscow. long letter took several minutes arrive, , took translators additional time translate , transcribe it.

robert f. kennedy described letter long , emotional. khrushchev reiterated basic outline had been stated scali earlier in day: propose: we, our part, declare our ships bound cuba not carrying armaments. declare united states not invade cuba troops , not support other forces might intend invade cuba. necessity of presence of our military specialists in cuba disappear. @ 6:45 pm edt, news of fomin s offer scali heard , interpreted set arrival of khrushchev s letter. letter considered official , accurate although later learned fomin operating of own accord without official backing. additional study of letter ordered , continued night.

crisis continues

direct aggression against cuba mean nuclear war. americans speak such aggression if did not know or did not want accept fact. have no doubt lose such war.

s-75 dvina v-750v 1d missile (nato sa-2 guideline) on launcher. installation similar 1 shot down major anderson s u-2 on cuba.

castro, on other hand, convinced invasion of cuba @ hand, , on october 26, sent telegram khrushchev appeared call pre-emptive nuclear strike on in case of attack. however, in 2010 interview, castro expressed regret earlier stance on first use: after ve seen ve seen, , knowing know now, wasn t worth @ all. castro ordered anti-aircraft weapons in cuba fire on aircraft: orders had been fire on groups of 2 or more. @ 6:00 am edt on october 27, cia delivered memo reporting 3 of 4 missile sites @ san cristobal , 2 sites @ sagua la grande appeared operational. noted cuban military continued organize action under order not initiate action unless attacked.

at 9:00 am edt on october 27, radio moscow began broadcasting message khrushchev. contrary letter of night before, message offered new trade: missiles on cuba removed in exchange removal of jupiter missiles italy , turkey. @ 10:00 am edt, executive committee met again discuss situation , came conclusion change in message because of internal debate between khrushchev , other party officials in kremlin. kennedy realized in insupportable position if becomes khrushchev s proposal because missiles in turkey not militarily useful , being removed anyway , s gonna – man @ united nations or other rational man, fair trade. bundy explained why khrushchev s public acquiescence not considered: current threat peace not in turkey, in cuba.

mcnamara noted tanker, grozny, 600 miles (970 km) out , should intercepted. noted had not made soviets aware of blockade line , suggested relaying information them via u thant @ united nations.

a lockheed u-2f, high altitude reconnaissance type shot down on cuba, being refueled boeing kc-135q. aircraft in 1962 painted overall gray , carried usaf military markings , national insignia.

while meeting progressed, @ 11:03 am edt new message began arrive khrushchev. message stated, in part:

disturbed on cuba. disturbs because ninety-nine miles sea coast of united states of america. but... have placed destructive missile weapons, call offensive, in italy , turkey, literally next us.... therefore make proposal: willing remove cuba means regard offensive.... representatives make declaration effect united states... remove analogous means turkey... , after that, persons entrusted united nations security council inspect on spot fulfillment of pledges made.

the executive committee continued meet through day.

throughout crisis, turkey had repeatedly stated upset if jupiter missiles removed. italy s prime minister amintore fanfani, foreign minister ad interim, offered allow withdrawal of missiles deployed in apulia bargaining chip. gave message 1 of trusted friends, ettore bernabei, general manager of rai-tv, convey arthur m. schlesinger jr. bernabei in new york attend international conference on satellite tv broadcasting. unknown soviets, regarded jupiter missiles obsolescent , supplanted polaris nuclear ballistic submarine missiles.

the engine of lockheed u-2 shot down on cuba on display @ museum of revolution in havana.

on morning of october 27, u-2f (the third cia u-2a, modified air-to-air refueling) piloted usaf major rudolf anderson, departed forward operating location @ mccoy afb, florida. @ approximately 12:00 pm edt, aircraft struck s-75 dvina (nato designation sa-2 guideline) surface-to-air missile launched cuba. aircraft shot down, , anderson killed. stress in negotiations between soviets , intensified; later believed decision fire missile made locally undetermined soviet commander, acting on own authority. later day, @ 3:41 pm edt, several navy rf-8a crusader aircraft, on low-level photoreconnaissance missions, fired upon.

on october 28, 1962, khrushchev told son sergei shooting down of anderson s u-2 cuban military @ direction of raul castro.

at 4:00 pm edt, kennedy recalled members of excomm white house , ordered message should sent u thant asking soviets suspend work on missiles while negotiations carried out. during meeting, general maxwell taylor delivered news u-2 had been shot down. kennedy had earlier claimed order attack on such sites if fired upon, decided not act unless attack made. forty years later, mcnamara said:

we had send u-2 on gain reconnaissance information on whether soviet missiles becoming operational. believed if u-2 shot down that—the cubans didn t have capabilities shoot down, soviets did—we believed if shot down, shot down soviet surface-to-air-missile unit, , represent decision soviets escalate conflict. , therefore, before sent u-2 out, agreed if shot down wouldn t meet, d attack. shot down on friday.... fortunately, changed our mind, thought well, might have been accident, won t attack. later learned khrushchev had reasoned did: send on u-2, if shot down, reasoned believe intentional escalation. , therefore, issued orders pliyev, soviet commander in cuba, instruct of batteries not shoot down u-2.

drafting response

emissaries sent both kennedy , khrushchev agreed meet @ yenching palace chinese restaurant in cleveland park neighborhood of washington, dc, on evening of october 27. kennedy suggested take khrushchev s offer trade away missiles. unknown members of excomm, robert kennedy had been meeting soviet ambassador in washington discover whether intentions genuine. excomm against proposal because undermine nato s authority, , turkish government had repeatedly stated against such trade.

as meeting progressed, new plan emerged, , kennedy persuaded. new plan called him ignore latest message , instead return khrushchev s earlier one. kennedy hesitant, feeling khrushchev no longer accept deal because new 1 had been offered, llewellyn thompson argued still possible. white house special counsel , adviser ted sorensen , robert kennedy left meeting , returned 45 minutes later, draft letter effect. president made several changes, had typed, , sent it.

after excomm meeting, smaller meeting continued in oval office. group argued letter should underscored oral message dobrynin stated if missiles not withdrawn, military action used remove them. rusk added 1 proviso no part of language of deal mention turkey, there understanding missiles removed voluntarily in immediate aftermath. president agreed, , message sent.

october 29, 1962 excomm meeting held in white house cabinet room. president kennedy, robert mcnamara , dean rusk.

at rusk s request, fomin , scali met again. scali asked why 2 letters khrushchev different, , fomin claimed because of poor communications. scali replied claim not credible , shouted thought stinking double cross. went on claim invasion hours away, , fomin stated response message expected khrushchev shortly , urged scali tell state department no treachery intended. scali said did not think believe him, agreed deliver message. 2 went separate ways, , scali typed out memo excomm.

within establishment, understood ignoring second offer , returning first put khrushchev in terrible position. military preparations continued, , active duty air force personnel recalled bases possible action. robert kennedy later recalled mood: had not abandoned hope, hope there rested khrushchev s revising course within next few hours. hope, not expectation. expectation military confrontation tuesday, , possibly tomorrow....

at 8:05 pm edt, letter drafted earlier in day delivered. message read, read letter, key elements of proposals—which seem acceptable understand them—are follows: 1) agree remove these weapons systems cuba under appropriate united nations observation , supervision; , undertake, suitable safe-guards, halt further introduction of such weapon systems cuba. 2) we, on our part, agree—upon establishment of adequate arrangements through united nations, ensure carrying out , continuation of these commitments (a) remove promptly quarantine measures in effect , (b) give assurances against invasion of cuba. letter released directly press ensure not delayed. letter delivered, deal on table. however, robert kennedy noted, there little expectation accepted. @ 9:00 pm edt, excomm met again review actions following day. plans drawn air strikes on missile sites other economic targets, notably petroleum storage. mcnamara stated had have 2 things ready: government cuba, because re going need one; , secondly, plans how respond soviet union in europe, because sure hell re going there.

at 12:12 am edt, on october 27, informed nato allies situation growing shorter.... united states may find necessary within short time in interest , of fellow nations in western hemisphere take whatever military action may necessary. add concern, @ 6:00 am, cia reported missiles in cuba ready action.

a u.s. navy hss-1 seabat helicopter hovers on soviet submarine b-59, forced surface u.s. naval forces in caribbean near cuba (october 28–29, 1962)

later same day, white house later called black saturday, navy dropped series of signaling depth charges (practice depth charges size of hand grenades) on soviet submarine (b-59) @ blockade line, unaware armed nuclear-tipped torpedo orders allowed used if submarine hulled (a hole in hull depth charges or surface fire). decision launch these required agreement 3 officers on board, 1 of them, vasili arkhipov, objected , launch narrowly averted.

on same day u-2 spy plane made accidental, unauthorized ninety-minute overflight of soviet union s far eastern coast. soviets responded scrambling mig fighters wrangel island; in turn, americans launched f-102 fighters armed nuclear air-to-air missiles on bering sea.

on october 27, khrushchev received letter castro, known armageddon letter (dated day before), interpreted urging use of nuclear force in event of attack on cuba: believe imperialists aggressiveness extremely dangerous , if carry out brutal act of invading cuba in violation of international law , morality, moment eliminate such danger forever through act of clear legitimate defense, harsh , terrible solution be, castro wrote.

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