Responses considered Cuban Missile Crisis

president kennedy meets in oval office general curtis lemay , reconnaissance pilots found missile sites in cuba.

the had no plan in place because intelligence had been convinced soviets never install nuclear missiles in cuba. excomm discussed several possible courses of action:

as article describes, both , soviet union considered many possible outcomes of actions , threats during crisis (allison, graham t.; zelikow, philip d.). game tree models how both actors have considered decisions. broken down simple form basic understanding.

the joint chiefs of staff unanimously agreed full-scale attack , invasion solution. believed soviets not attempt stop conquering cuba. kennedy skeptical:

they, no more we, can let these things go without doing something. can t, after statements, permit take out missiles, kill lot of russians, , nothing. if don t take action in cuba, in berlin.

kennedy concluded attacking cuba air signal soviets presume clear line conquer berlin. kennedy believed allies think of country trigger-happy cowboys lost berlin because not peacefully resolve cuban situation.

president kennedy , secretary of defense mcnamara in excomm meeting.

the excomm discussed effect on strategic balance of power, both political , military. joint chiefs of staff believed missiles alter military balance, mcnamara disagreed. 40, reasoned, make little difference overall strategic balance. had approximately 5,000 strategic warheads, soviet union had 300. mcnamara concluded soviets having 340 not therefore substantially alter strategic balance. in 1990, reiterated made no difference.... military balance wasn t changed. didn t believe then, , don t believe now.

the excomm agreed missiles affect political balance. kennedy had explicitly promised american people less month before crisis if cuba should possess capacity carry out offensive actions against united states... united states act. also, credibility among allies , people damaged if soviet union appeared redress strategic balance placing missiles in cuba. kennedy explained after crisis have politically changed balance of power. have appeared to, , appearances contribute reality.

president kennedy meets soviet foreign minister andrei gromyko in oval office (october 18, 1962)

on october 18, kennedy met soviet minister of foreign affairs, andrei gromyko, claimed weapons defensive purposes only. not wanting expose knew , avoid panicking american public, kennedy did not reveal aware of missile buildup.

by october 19, frequent u-2 spy flights showed 4 operational sites. on night of october 19 @ 23:56 helicopter uss essex cvs-9 squadron hss-2 crashed gulf of mexico. lt. cmdr. james robert hughes , am-3 george blythe perished. bodies never recovered. on october 22, 1962 second helicopter crashed gulf, hss-2 stationed on essex. lost night lt. cmdr. witkowski , enlisted serviceman 50 az murphy. details of deaths of october 19, 1962 have never been provided families affected. there numerous rumors exist bad storms, soviet interference flight, or one-way suicide recon mission. however, consistently repeated accounts on deck witnesses indicate helicopter on october 19 shot down.