Drafting response Cuban Missile Crisis

emissaries sent both kennedy , khrushchev agreed meet @ yenching palace chinese restaurant in cleveland park neighborhood of washington, dc, on evening of october 27. kennedy suggested take khrushchev s offer trade away missiles. unknown members of excomm, robert kennedy had been meeting soviet ambassador in washington discover whether intentions genuine. excomm against proposal because undermine nato s authority, , turkish government had repeatedly stated against such trade.

as meeting progressed, new plan emerged, , kennedy persuaded. new plan called him ignore latest message , instead return khrushchev s earlier one. kennedy hesitant, feeling khrushchev no longer accept deal because new 1 had been offered, llewellyn thompson argued still possible. white house special counsel , adviser ted sorensen , robert kennedy left meeting , returned 45 minutes later, draft letter effect. president made several changes, had typed, , sent it.

after excomm meeting, smaller meeting continued in oval office. group argued letter should underscored oral message dobrynin stated if missiles not withdrawn, military action used remove them. rusk added 1 proviso no part of language of deal mention turkey, there understanding missiles removed voluntarily in immediate aftermath. president agreed, , message sent.

october 29, 1962 excomm meeting held in white house cabinet room. president kennedy, robert mcnamara , dean rusk.

at rusk s request, fomin , scali met again. scali asked why 2 letters khrushchev different, , fomin claimed because of poor communications. scali replied claim not credible , shouted thought stinking double cross. went on claim invasion hours away, , fomin stated response message expected khrushchev shortly , urged scali tell state department no treachery intended. scali said did not think believe him, agreed deliver message. 2 went separate ways, , scali typed out memo excomm.

within establishment, understood ignoring second offer , returning first put khrushchev in terrible position. military preparations continued, , active duty air force personnel recalled bases possible action. robert kennedy later recalled mood: had not abandoned hope, hope there rested khrushchev s revising course within next few hours. hope, not expectation. expectation military confrontation tuesday, , possibly tomorrow....

at 8:05 pm edt, letter drafted earlier in day delivered. message read, read letter, key elements of proposals—which seem acceptable understand them—are follows: 1) agree remove these weapons systems cuba under appropriate united nations observation , supervision; , undertake, suitable safe-guards, halt further introduction of such weapon systems cuba. 2) we, on our part, agree—upon establishment of adequate arrangements through united nations, ensure carrying out , continuation of these commitments (a) remove promptly quarantine measures in effect , (b) give assurances against invasion of cuba. letter released directly press ensure not delayed. letter delivered, deal on table. however, robert kennedy noted, there little expectation accepted. @ 9:00 pm edt, excomm met again review actions following day. plans drawn air strikes on missile sites other economic targets, notably petroleum storage. mcnamara stated had have 2 things ready: government cuba, because re going need one; , secondly, plans how respond soviet union in europe, because sure hell re going there.

at 12:12 am edt, on october 27, informed nato allies situation growing shorter.... united states may find necessary within short time in interest , of fellow nations in western hemisphere take whatever military action may necessary. add concern, @ 6:00 am, cia reported missiles in cuba ready action.

a u.s. navy hss-1 seabat helicopter hovers on soviet submarine b-59, forced surface u.s. naval forces in caribbean near cuba (october 28–29, 1962)

later same day, white house later called black saturday, navy dropped series of signaling depth charges (practice depth charges size of hand grenades) on soviet submarine (b-59) @ blockade line, unaware armed nuclear-tipped torpedo orders allowed used if submarine hulled (a hole in hull depth charges or surface fire). decision launch these required agreement 3 officers on board, 1 of them, vasili arkhipov, objected , launch narrowly averted.

on same day u-2 spy plane made accidental, unauthorized ninety-minute overflight of soviet union s far eastern coast. soviets responded scrambling mig fighters wrangel island; in turn, americans launched f-102 fighters armed nuclear air-to-air missiles on bering sea.

on october 27, khrushchev received letter castro, known armageddon letter (dated day before), interpreted urging use of nuclear force in event of attack on cuba: believe imperialists aggressiveness extremely dangerous , if carry out brutal act of invading cuba in violation of international law , morality, moment eliminate such danger forever through act of clear legitimate defense, harsh , terrible solution be, castro wrote.